Over the past week, changes in the Blue and White party hit the headlines when Members of Knesset Chili Tropper and Eitan Ginzburg announced their departure from the party and consideration of their future political path. Concurrently, questions arose concerning the meaning of their remaining in the Knesset, the possibility of continuing to operate in coordination with the faction despite leaving the party, and potential implications of resignation, splitting, or establishing a separate factional framework.

Beyond the concrete matter, these events appear to raise principled questions regarding the implications of parting ways between a Member of Knesset and their faction, and how such a move might impact the future of both party and MK alike. Understanding that this is an event relevant not only to the outgoing Knesset but also to forthcoming elections is important. Must an MK leaving a party that served as their political home resign immediately from the Knesset? Can they continue serving and operating in coordination with the faction? Or operate detached from the faction? And when does a political shift become sufficiently substantive to impair the voter’s will?

Party, Candidate List, Faction, and What Lies Between

To conduct an informed discussion on the issue, distinguishing among three close yet distinct concepts in Israel’s political system—party, candidate list, and faction—is necessary. A party is the organized political body outside the Knesset, defined in the Parties Law, 5752–1992 as a group associated to advance political or social goals and bring about their representation in the Knesset. A candidate list is the framework contesting elections, which as such may include candidates from a single party or multiple parties. Following elections, a candidate list elected to the Knesset becomes a faction, considered the basic parliamentary activity unit in the Knesset. Akin to a list, a faction may comprise representatives from a single party or multiple parties (termed a joint faction when several parties are represented together within the same factional framework). This is an important distinction, because even when several parties contest together on a single list, they do not necessarily lose their identity as separate parties, which carries implications in case of secession, as elaborated below. Concurrently, the Knesset faction may change during the term, for instance following a merger, split, or secession.

Can Members of Knesset Split from a Faction During the Knesset Term?

Israeli law recognizes a changing reality and views no “political shift” or changes in factional composition during a Knesset term as illegitimate. Quite the contrary; the law recognizes that factions disintegrate, partnerships change, and MKs occasionally seek to continue operating within another political framework. Therefore, alongside the desire to preserve factional stability and loyalty to the voter’s will, the law permits splitting from a faction, provided it is executed via one of the tracks prescribed by law and approved by the House Committee. Hence the important question is not merely whether a departure occurred, but how it was executed—whether via a recognized split track or as secession considered an illicit act? We elaborate below.

When Will a Faction Split Be Considered Legitimate?

Section 59 of the Knesset Law, 5754–1994 (hereinafter: the “Knesset Law”) prescribes conditions wherein secession from a faction will be considered a legitimate split, enabling seceding MKs to preserve their parliamentary status and rights. The law defines three central tracks:

• Numerical split, permitted only when at least two MKs secede, constituting one-third of the faction;
• Split based on original party affiliation, when the faction was initially established as a combination of parties and a formal agreement to that effect was submitted to the Central Elections Committee;
• Split upon faction merger, enabling MKs opposing the merger to split as a single group, and even move to another faction if they so choose.

In each of these tracks, the split is perceived not as an illicit act, but as a procedure recognized by law. Consequently, splitting MKs are not considered “defectors” in the negative legal sense, and bear none of the sanctions applying to illicit secession.

What Is Illicit Secession and Why Is the Distinction Between It and a Split Significant?

Illicit secession or “defection” is a state where an MK leaves their faction outside the framework of one of the recognized statutory split tracks mentioned above. In other words, this is an action that in certain respects frustrates political plans as formulated on the eve of elections and is therefore considered illegitimate secession. Upon an MK acting thus, and failing to resign close to their departure, Section 6A of the Basic Law: The Knesset imposes a sanction whereby they cannot run in elections for the next Knesset within a framework represented in the outgoing Knesset—meaning they can run only in a new party. Clarifying that this sanction will not apply should a faction split pursuant to conditions mentioned above prescribed in Section 59 of the Knesset Law, nor apply should the MK resign close to the secession decision, is warranted. Additionally, sanctions are imposed upon them in the current Knesset as well. Thus, for example, an MK whose secession was announced by the House Committee shall not be joined to any existing faction,[1] nor be capable of serving as a minister during the term of that same Knesset.[2]

Thus, a faction split will be considered a legitimate action, distinct from secession liable to trigger sanctions. Recognizing a split as legitimate expresses a balance between two central interests: on one hand, preventing political defection of an MK or a small number of MKs while utilizing the mandate granted to the list, and on the other hand preserving political, moral, and ideological leeway within a changing parliamentary reality.

The legitimacy of a split carries practical significance as well; it enables splitting MKs to preserve their parliamentary rights in the current Knesset wherein they serve; run in upcoming elections absent restrictions applying to an MK considered a seceder; and even preserve relevant entitlement to party financing per the new factional composition. Thereby the law not only “punishes” illicit secession, but marks a regulated path for legitimate political change within the Knesset. The rationale underlying this mechanism is, as mentioned, the practical need to recognize a changing political reality while preventing abuse of the mandate granted to the MK by the voting public.

Distinguishing between an MK’s secession from their faction versus a faction split is designed to balance two central interests: on one hand preserving the voter’s will, factional stability, and public trust that MKs will not shift from one political framework to another in exchange for a benefit (a phenomenon known as “Kolanterism”[3]). On the other hand, recognizing that MKs are not mere “statisticians,” but elected officials holding political, moral, and ideological discretion, required at times to respond to a changing political reality and up-to-date public mood. Accordingly, Supreme Court case law likewise recognized the tension between the desire to preserve authentic factional representativeness and prevent illicit secessions, versus the need to leave MKs a certain margin of political independence.[4]

In the judgment rendered in the matter of MK Amichai Chikli,[5] the Supreme Court sharpened the distinction between illicit secession and a regulated split, addressing the question of whether an MK declared as having seceded from their faction and subsequently resigning is permitted to run in upcoming elections within a list represented in the outgoing Knesset. The court emphasized that the Israeli system is based on voting for lists rather than personal choice of individual MKs. Consequently, it was determined that when an MK secedes from their faction, concern arises that they act contrary to the mandate granted the list by voters. In that matter, inter alia, the question of the timing of MK Chikli’s resignation from the Knesset and whether it is considered resigning close to secession was discussed. The court determined by majority opinion that despite flaws attending Chikli’s conduct, given the ambiguity accompanying the procedure and timings, his appeal was accepted and he is permitted to inclusion on the Likud list for the next Knesset.

Does a Split Carry Economic Significance as Well?

Beyond political and parliamentary significance, a split appears to carry budgetary significance as well. Party financing in Israel is based, inter alia, on the number of MKs numbering in each faction. Section 4(a)(1) of the Parties Financing Law prescribes that a faction submitting a candidate list for elections to the next Knesset is entitled to financing per the financing units of all MKs numbering within it. The House Committee is the competent body to approve changes in factional composition, including faction splitting, list mergers, and factional secession. This approval determines the change in the number of members of various factions in the Knesset and correspondingly impacts financing. In other words, a faction split, when perceived as a legitimate action and approved by the House Committee, effectively alters factional composition formally and correspondingly their financing base for upcoming elections.

Thus, recognizing a legitimate split is not merely a principled statement, but one carrying practical implications for MKs’ status, parliamentary rights, ability to run in upcoming elections, and party financing.

And What in Practice?

Recent events and myriad developments following them vividly illustrate that leaving a party is not necessarily “the end of the story.” An MK might resign, leave their party yet remain in the Knesset while continuing to operate in coordination with their faction, secede, or move to another party. The possibility of a “institutionalized” factional split possessing political and budgetary significance likewise obtains. In other words: distinguishing among various terms is genuinely important, so that not every departure is defection, and not every shift in factional composition is illicit. Additionally, the possibility remains open for the MK to resign immediately following the secession announcement, thereby enabling them to run on any list of their choice already in subsequent elections.

Footnotes

[1] Knesset Law, s. 61(d).

[2] Basic Law: The Government, s. 6(e).

[3] A term in political discourse describing shifting from one faction to another in exchange for a benefit. The term was coined after Rachamim Kolanter, a Jerusalem City Council member in the 1950s who left his party to prevent ousting then-Jerusalem Mayor Gershon Agron in exchange for the deputy mayor post.

[4] For expansion see C.A. 4799/19 MK Ariel Kellner v. Likud – National Liberal Party (Nevoo, July 28, 2019) and authorities cited therein.

[5] E.A. 6615/22 Amichai Chikli v. Chairman of 25th Knesset Central Elections Committee, Yitzhak Amit (Nevoo, Nov. 3, 2022).