Spotlight
26.05.2025: תאריך פרסום המחקר
In recent weeks, following the affair surrounding the dismissal of the head of the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), the name of the Advisory Committee for Senior Appointments has repeatedly made headlines. What is this committee? What is its purpose? Who sits on it, and why is it so relevant in a complex political reality? We are here to put things in order.
As a rule, within the framework of public appointments in Israel, civil service positions are typically filled through public tenders aimed at selecting the most suitable candidate based on principles of professionalism, equal opportunity, and transparency. Alongside all those committees examining competence and professional suitability for a variety of roles, an additional and unique committee operates with a dedicated and narrow mandate—the Advisory Committee for Senior Appointments.
This committee, established following past lessons and the need to ensure the propriety of appointments to key positions in the public service—or as the President of the Supreme Court recently termed them, the “Magnificent Seven”—does not deal with the question of who the best candidate is, but rather focuses on another, no less fundamental question: Does the proposed appointment pass the test of probity (taohar hamidot)?
The need for a committee of this kind was sharpened following the “Bar-On Hebron Affair” in 1997, which raised suspicions of extraneous considerations in the appointment of Adv. Roni Bar-On to the position of Attorney General—an appointment that provoked sharp public and media criticism and ended with Bar-On’s resignation just two days later. At the heart of the affair stood the suspicion that the appointment was not made from substantive considerations alone, but was part of a political deal. The public uproar led to the launch of an extensive police investigation, during which senior public figures were questioned, including the then-prime minister. Beyond the criminal suspicions themselves, the affair exposed a significant systemic flaw: some of the most senior appointments in the country essentially undergo no external vetting prior to their approval by the government. Thus it transpired that appointments to the most sensitive and important public positions in the country—such as the Attorney General, the IDF Chief of Staff, the Police Commissioner, and the heads of the Mossad and Shin Bet—are executed by the government without any external and independent vetting process examining candidates prior to appointment.
As one of the central lessons of the affair, and in order to prevent the recurrence of similar cases and strengthen public trust in the appointment process, the government decided to establish the Advisory Committee for Senior Appointments. The resolution stipulated that the committee’s role would be to examine candidates for those summit positions enumerated in the resolution from the perspective of probity alone, before the appointment is brought for government approval, thereby adding a layer of external oversight to these appointments.
The committee’s format was anchored in government resolutions, the latest of which is a resolution from 2018. As a rule, the committee’s role is to assist in staffing positions exercising decisive influence over state security, economic stability, and social resilience, as these involve appointments to Israel’s defense and economic leadership.
Over the years, the seven positions whose candidates the committee is tasked with vetting were precisely defined: the IDF Chief of Staff, the Police Commissioner, the Head of the Shin Bet, the Director of the Mossad, the Commissioner of the Israel Prison Service, the Governor of the Bank of Israel, and the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Israel. In its current composition, the committee numbers four members: a retired Supreme Court Justice, appointed by the government and serving as committee chairperson; the Civil Service Commissioner; and two public representatives appointed by the government. Both the chairperson and the public representatives are appointed after consultation with the Attorney General for a single six-year term without the possibility of extension. As for the Civil Service Commissioner, they serve on the committee for as long as they hold their position.
Operationally, the procedure before the committee includes receiving detailed information on the candidate from the appointing authority, publishing a notice to the public and receiving responses, gathering additional information (including opinions from the Attorney General and other law enforcement bodies), and holding interviews with the candidate, the proposing minister, and other relevant entities. At the conclusion of the process, the committee formulates a reasoned opinion. It is important to clarify that although case law and Attorney General guidelines have established that substantial weight must be accorded to its recommendations, and that deviation therefrom requires weighty justifications and exceptional circumstances, ultimately, the committee’s opinion is advisory only. That is, practically speaking, the committee does not definitively approve or veto appointments.
Although on its face the committee’s role concerns appointments, previous government resolutions also addressed the issue of early termination of tenure for senior officials (those whose tenure is fixed or who possess a minimum timeframe). These resolutions established that as a rule, terminating the tenure of the seven senior positions mentioned above should be done upon the committee’s recommendation and, inter alia, on defined grounds of “distinct unsuitability” or “an acute and prolonged crisis of trust.”
It is important to emphasize: the committee’s sole role is to examine the proposed appointment through the prism of probity. Namely, unlike parallel appointment committees in the public service, the Advisory Committee for Senior Appointments does not examine the candidate’s professional qualifications, experience, or professional suitability for the position; these questions remain within the responsibility of the appointing authority—namely, the Prime Minister or the relevant minister.
What does this concept include? According to government resolution and Supreme Court case law, this is a two-stage test of the appointment and the candidate. Namely, the committee examines whether the appointment was made from substantive considerations of the state’s welfare, or whether it is tainted by extraneous considerations such as personal, business, or political proximity to figures in government. It also examines whether a flaw exists in the conduct of the candidate themselves—for example, a criminal or disciplinary record, concern over a conflict of interest, or other actions raising doubt regarding their integrity and value-based suitability for such a senior public office. A relatively recent example in this context can be found in the Supreme Court’s ruling not to intervene in the committee’s decision to recommend the appointment of current Police Commissioner Kobi Shabtai [Note: or current commissioner Danny Levy, per text], notwithstanding allegations regarding ties between him and the Minister of National Security. In this context, it was determined that the committee’s decision was made while weighing all relevant considerations, on the basis of a full factual basis, and that no flaw was found in the appointment once it was determined that the connection between the two did not cross the threshold required to constitute improper political affiliation.
In March 2025, the government approved the Prime Minister’s proposal to terminate the tenure of the head of the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), with the official reasoning published being “continuous distrust that intensified over time.” In response, officials on behalf of the Attorney General’s Office raised difficulties in advancing the move based on several arguments, including concerns over conflicts of interest and flaws in the process. This step drew sharp public criticism, and following petitions filed, the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice decided to issue an order nisi freezing the move. Without delving into the merits of the matter, it appears that the proceedings taken regarding the current Shin Bet head, and the legal dispute arising therefrom, touch inter alia upon a broader question: whether the regulated procedure established by the government itself in its resolutions was implemented.
As noted, when the decision is to initiate dismissal proceedings, the advisory committee is—pursuant to grounds set by the government over the years—a central body regarding early tenure termination, and its opinion must be obtained. In the unconventional reality of early dismissal, there is heightened concern not only over the actual entry of extraneous considerations, but also over the very suspicion or appearance of such considerations entering. Therefore, beyond the formal aspects involved, it appears that in situations of this kind, there is genuine public importance in utilizing the Advisory Committee for Senior Appointments, which is in many ways the institutional tool designed to filter out concerns of this sort and ensure that decisions regarding those officeholders directly impacting citizens’ lives in the state are made from substantive motives alone.
Undoubtedly, at the end of the day, policy determinations are reserved for the elected echelon. However, precisely in sensitive issues such as the appointment and dismissal of senior officials in the public service, and especially during a period of political tension, adhering strictly to pre-established rules of the game is of genuine importance. Meticulousness in operating the oversight mechanisms that the government itself established is not merely a technical matter, but an expression of commitment to the rule of law and the democratic values upon which the state is founded. When clear and stable rules exist, navigating a complex reality saturated with disputes becomes easier.
Therefore, although the issue is presented as a נקודתית (punctual) dispute and in light of the above, the debate concerning the Advisory Committee for Senior Appointments is not merely another isolated dispute but part of a broader picture. It concerns the vital need for an institutional rule system ensuring that even in times of crisis and acute dispute, decisions are made on the basis of substantive considerations alone, while preserving the independence and professionalism of the institutions safeguarding state security and its values. In this sense, the Advisory Committee for Senior Appointments is part of a mechanism aimed at preserving public trust in state institutions, and ensuring that appointments are made on the basis of integrity, professionalism, and independence. As such, it is indeed a significant part of a broader institutional fabric—one constituting the infrastructure for the state’s resilience.
