In recent months, the institution of the Attorney General has stood at the center of public and legal discourse, becoming a significant point of contention in the political arena. Foundational questions concerning its status, appointment method, and scope of powers arise repeatedly, and two legislative initiatives by coalition members proposing to split the role were recently laid on the Knesset table. What is the role of the Attorney General? What is its importance, and what are the pros and cons of splitting the role? We are here to put things in order.

1. On the Nature of the Attorney General’s Role: Advisor, Supervisor, Gatekeeper?

The Attorney General, considered one of the pillars of the rule of law, is appointed by the government upon the recommendations of a search committee for a single six-year term and heads Israel’s law enforcement system.[1] Their primary tasks are to assist government bodies in realizing their policy within the framework of the law and to head the law enforcement system.

The role of the Attorney General was shaped largely based on the model customary during the British Mandate in Palestine, combined with unique Israeli characteristics that developed and were shaped over the years. The central premise of the role is that the Attorney General is a state institution devoid of a political character, but rather one who fulfills their role out of a conception of professional public service.[2] The underlying goal of this approach is that the considerations guiding the officeholder will be legal and substantive, ensuring objective and independent operation for the public interest. The Attorney General’s powers are anchored in dozens of legislative provisions, yet the core of their role and status was established through customs and traditions validated by the recurring conduct of governments and attorneys general serving over the years.

2. What Are the Attorney General’s Powers Today?

The Attorney General is customarily viewed as operating across five core domains:

• The Authorized Interpreter of the Law – The Attorney General’s opinion regarding the interpretation of laws guiding the actions of the government and public authorities is considered the legal interpretation reflecting the law for the government, as long as the court has not ruled otherwise. Over time, it was determined that the Attorney General’s opinions are binding on all governing authorities—namely, both the government and all other authorities of the state.[3]
• Head of the General Prosecution and Supervisor of Criminal Law Enforcement – The Attorney General is the body responsible for enforcing criminal law on behalf of the state. A primary derivative of this role is deciding on prosecution, including for public figures and senior public officeholders, alongside unique prosecution powers such as in offenses of incitement and racism. Note that in exercising criminal law enforcement powers, the Attorney General is entirely independent, subject to no authority save the public interest.[4]
• Representation of the State in Court – The Attorney General and their representatives represent the position of the state and its various authorities in civil proceedings where the state sues or is sued. A distinction must be made between appearing in court pursuant to statutory powers for criminal law enforcement and serving as head of the general prosecution, versus the role of representing in court. While the former is a proactive, primary authority exercised initially, this representation authority is ex post facto, concerning the presentation of the state’s position after an authorized authority has already acted and the matter is being examined before a judicial tribunal.[5]
• Legal Counsel to the Government and Authorities – To ensure government actions are performed lawfully, the Attorney General provides ongoing counsel to ministers and the government on a regular basis. Within this authority, the Attorney General (via relevant departments in the Ministry of Justice) is entrusted with drafting government bills and formulating positions regarding private bills.[6]
• Representation of the Public Interest and Safeguarding the Rule of Law – The Attorney General holds diverse powers pursuant to a long series of enactments, in all of which they are entrusted with actualizing the public interest. Thus, for example, Civil Procedure Regulations regulate the Attorney General’s authority to appear in proceedings and voice their position in court whenever seeing that a right of the State of Israel, a public right, or a public interest is affected or implicated. Granting unique powers to the Attorney General across various laws reflects both the legislature’s trust that the Attorney General will act objectively and fairly, and the substantive nature of the role across various operational domains, as a professional supervisor ensuring the rule of law.

Emphasize that despite potential overlaps among these powers, the roles described above are separate and distinct, with legal systems existing where they are divided among different officeholders or departments. In Israel, despite the distinction, the institution of the Attorney General holds all powers. This concentration makes the Attorney General professionally the apex of jurists in the public service across all roles, placing sweeping powers exceeding those customary in most global democracies in the Attorney General’s hands. Against this backdrop, among other things, proposals to split the role have been on the table for many years.

3. What Is the Proposal for Institutional Split and What Lies Behind It?

Responsibility for governmental legal counsel and heading the law enforcement array generates immense power for the role. For many years, and in fact to this day, various proposals whose primary focus is splitting the institution of the Attorney General have surfaced and receded from the political agenda.

The guiding premise shared by most proposals on the subject is separating the role of the Prosecutor General, entrusted with criminal law enforcement, from the institution of the Attorney General to create two separate and independent authorities. The central arguments supporting this institutional change are apprehension regarding a conflict of interest between the Attorney General’s various hats and the concentration of excessive power in a single entity. Where precisely might the conflict of interest lie? The conflict is ostensibly clear: the Attorney General serves both as close counsel to the government and as head of the general prosecution. On one hand, they participate in decision-making and maintain trust-based relations with ministers; on the other hand, they may be required to investigate or indict them. Some also point to a broader problem: concentrating sweeping powers in the Attorney General harms democratic checks and balances; thus, a split would enable workload distribution, specialization, and functional separation assisting both the advisory and enforcement hats to operate efficiently.

Simultaneously, counter-considerations demand caution. As early as 1997, a professional committee headed by former Supreme Court President Meir Shamgar was established to examine appointment methods for the Attorney General and tenure-related issues. During its work, the committee examined the possibility of splitting the role and chose to maintain the existing structure. The central reasoning was that the very concentration of powers grants the Attorney General the power needed to enforce the rule of law, even against senior political figures. Hence, it was argued, splitting powers might weaken the entire system rather than benefit it.

Beyond this, concern exists regarding politicization of the legal counsel institution and inter-agency competition, since if the Attorney General’s role were reduced to counsel alone, governments might appoint “complaisant” advisors, while prosecution would operate in a separate, parallel channel without influencing decision-making. This state could lead to two bodies meant to operate in synergy becoming adversarial over time. That is, a split between two bodies with overlapping spheres of responsibility carries tangible potential for friction and conflict between governmental arms, potentially harming legal system uniformity, leading to multiplicity of officeholders, contradictory opinions, and functional paralysis.

In the background stands the unsettled foundational question: Who will be the authoritative interpreter of the law in the state? Creating two separate legal focal points without an institutional mechanism to adjudicate between them could lead to legal uncertainty, splintered legal authority, and harm the state’s ability to fully protect the public interest.

4. What Bills Are Currently on the Table? How Will They Impact the AG Institution?

Recently, two private bills on this topic were brought before the Ministerial Committee for Legislation and decided for advancement. Each proposes a slightly different model:

• MK Hanoch Dov Milvitzky’s Bill (Prosecutor General Bill, 5783–2022)[7] seeks to regulate the appointment and powers of the “Prosecutor General”—a new role entrusted with managing the general prosecution and all criminal proceedings on behalf of the state. Per the proposal, prosecution powers should be fully separated from the institution of the Attorney General, while leaving the Prosecutor General the option to advise the government and Justice Minister on criminal law legislation.
• MK Michel Buskila’s Bill (Bill to Split the Role of Attorney General, 5785–2024)[8] is narrower in scope, focusing on criminal enforcement regarding public figures, which currently allegedly generates an institutional conflict for the Attorney General as both advising public figures and being entrusted with their indictment. Per the proposal, the decision whether to open an investigation or indict a prime minister, minister, or member of Knesset would be transferred to the State Attorney, who would be required to consult a special committee established for this purpose.

Despite similarity in purpose, the two bills differ substantially, both in split scope and the degree of independence granted to enforcement bodies.

MK Michel Buskila’s bill is relatively moderate. Under this proposal, all current Attorney General powers (counsel, criminal law enforcement, state representation in court, and safeguarding public interest) remain intact, save for the power to investigate and indict ministers and members of Knesset. This power would transfer to the State Attorney, while decisions would require approval from a special committee comprising: a retired Supreme Court Justice, a former Attorney General, and a defense counsel chosen by the Chief National Public Defender. This is ostensibly a balanced mechanism, but the possibility of subjugating opening investigations against MKs to dedicated committee approval must be examined cautiously, as such a step could create a substantive barrier in such proceedings. Currently, authorization from the head of police investigations is sufficient; transferring authority to a committee could burden proceedings and harm law enforcement efficacy regarding public figures.

MK Hanoch Dov Milvitzky’s bill, conversely, is far more radical, altering the DNA of the entire general prosecution array to the point of transforming it into a political body. Per the proposal, while advisory authority remains with the Attorney General, criminal law enforcement authority would transfer entirely to the Prosecutor General. Concurrently, representation authority would be split, such that the Attorney General handles civil and administrative proceedings while the Prosecutor General handles criminal proceedings. Furthermore, the Prosecutor General could advise on criminal law legislation. It is further proposed that the Prosecutor General, entrusted with the prosecution array practically, be appointed per narrow threshold conditions by the Justice Minister with Constitution Committee approval, and no longer be subordinate to the Attorney General. In other words, this is full politicization of the body responsible for initiating investigations and indictments in Israel.

If that were not enough, the bill also includes establishing a new prosecution array replacing and dismantling the State Attorney’s Office and Police Prosecution. Under the new array, only individuals chosen by the Justice Minister or Prosecutor General would be appointed as prosecutors or attorneys, meaning no incumbent state attorney could continue serving without explicit approval from the Justice Minister. This is a far-reaching change granting the political echelon direct control over enforcement and legal team composition during a highly sensitive public period and amid ongoing legal proceedings against an incumbent prime minister.

Marginally, note that the proposals fail to address a significant question regarding the Attorney General’s role: Who will be considered the binding legal interpreter of the law—the one whose opinion binds the government and other governing authorities? Splitting the role could create a situation of two parallel legal arenas without a clear institutional adjudication mechanism between them. In such a reality, tangible concern exists for legal ambiguity and systemic paralysis from within, whereas under the current model a single authority oversees the executive branch’s legal system, enabling a high degree of uniformity, finality, and certainty.

5. What Is the Customary Global Model?

Unlike the Israeli model, where advisory powers and general prosecution powers are united, many countries practice an institutional split between the two roles. Thus, approximately 58% of global democracies, and about 61% of Western democracies, feature a full institutional split between the prosecution and the attorney general, whereas a model of institutional and functional unity like Israel’s is exceptional, existing in only 37% of global democracies.

For comparison, a review of various models across several Western countries follows. Four countries—Britain, the United States, Canada, and Singapore—share the common law tradition with Israel, rendering comparison particularly relevant. Additionally, Switzerland and Denmark will be presented; despite practicing civil law, they excel in independent, effective governance institutions and high public trust, thus providing important insights. Save for Singapore, all examined countries are OECD members, yet Singapore’s review adds an important comparative layer as a developed nation with a stable legal system.

• Britain: The Attorney General is a senior legal advisor to the government, of which they are a member. Appointment is by the Prime Minister, formally approved by the Monarch. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) is a separate body operating independently, headed by the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). The DPP is appointed by the Attorney General pursuant to Section 2(1) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985.[9] Appointment is conducted via a professional selection committee submitting recommendations to the Attorney General, who makes the final decision and assumes formal responsibility.[10] Following criticism regarding police dual-wielding of investigation and prosecution, the CPS was established in 1986 as an independent body responsible for all criminal prosecutions in England and Wales. Despite the institutional split, the CPS and DPP are subject to the Attorney General’s general oversight and responsibility across various aspects (including influencing DPP tenure termination). While the DPP generally decides on indictment independently, sensitive areas like national security require the Attorney General’s approval.[11]
• Denmark: The split is sharper; legal counsel is provided by a private law firm (Kammeradvokaten / Poul Schmith, advising since 1936 on civil, administrative, and international matters), while the prosecution is headed by an independent Prosecutor General operating under the Justice Minister’s general oversight without political interference in concrete decisions.[12]
• Switzerland: Clear distinction exists; the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) handles investigation and prosecution, headed by the Attorney General elected by the Federal Assembly (Parliament). The Federal Office of Justice (FOJ) provides governmental legal counsel, forming part of the Federal Department of Justice and Police without engaging in criminal enforcement.[13]
• United States: No institutional split exists, similar to Israel. The Attorney General is appointed by the President with Senate confirmation, entrusted with both legal-advisory and enforcement/indictment powers.[14]
• Singapore: The Attorney General serves as Prosecutor General, holding authority to initiate, conduct, or terminate proceedings for any offense. Appointed by the President upon the Prime Minister’s recommendation, requiring qualifications for Supreme Court Justice. Prior to recommendation, the Prime Minister consults the outgoing Attorney General, Chief Justice, and Public Service Commission Chairman. The Attorney General is not a Member of Parliament or Cabinet, removable only with presidential consent upon Prime Minister recommendation following judicial committee opinion (in cases of incapacity or misconduct).[15]
• Canada: A model similar to Israel exists, where the Attorney General serves as head of general prosecution; moreover, the role is held by the Minister of Justice. The Public Prosecution Service of Canada (PPSC) manages criminal cases under the Attorney General’s formal responsibility and name. The Deputy Attorney General is the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), managing the PPSC as a separate government organization, appointed by the Governor General on ministerial recommendation for a seven-year term.[16]

Comparing Canada and Singapore to Israel illustrates shared parliamentary democratic frameworks and common law traditions, yet structural tensions inherent in unified models—such as illustrated in Canada’s 2019 SNC-Lavalin affair—demonstrate how dual roles uniting political membership in government with professional independence as prosecutor can provoke acute structural friction.

6. How Will the Bottom Line Impact the Big Picture?

Debating the split of Attorney General powers may sound like organizational-technical changes, but involve profound impacts on Israel’s governance system. Proponents point to advantages: separating roles reduces conflicts of interest, decentralizes power, and clarifies jurisdictional boundaries, aligning with administrative efficiency and separation of powers. Conversely, drawbacks and risks over the long term include potential weakening of oversight, confusion, friction, and contradiction between cooperating arms.

Beyond structural considerations, the timing of proposed changes warrants scrutiny. Immediate execution of a split amid sharp public controversy risks being perceived as targeted intervention regarding ongoing investigations or political trials, damaging public trust. A more gradual, transparent timeline—such as taking effect upon concluding an existing tenure—could divest the move of personal or temporary associations, strengthening public credibility.

Ultimately, the question is not merely what is changed, but when and how. The Attorney General is not an ordinary administrative unit but a foundational component of Israel’s democratic governance. A careful, systematic examination respecting long-term systemic implications is essential.